Ultimately, how would the American occupiers perceive their role as re-educators in Berlin, a city whose classical music culture had been the most highly politicized in all of the Third Reich? At the center of American cultural reconstruction efforts was the Berlin Philharmonic, the most illustrious ensemble residing in the American sector. Beginning in July of 1945, military government authorities regulated the ensemble's repertoire, musicians, and management in accordance with denazification procedures, as the Philharmonic's former role as the Reich's chosen orchestra (Reichsorchester) made the orchestra particularly symbolic for American efforts in postwar Germany.
Still, American authorities would use the Philharmonic in much the same way the National Socialists had: as an orchestra for the re-education of audiences. Just as the Philharmonic had once concertized in support of the Nazi war effort, giving lengthy tours throughout occupied Europe, the ensemble was also the sound of the Allied occupation. Of the seventy concerts the Philharmonic played from May until December of 1945, more than one third (twenty-eight concerts) were performed especially for Allied soldiers.
5 Whereas the National Socialists had controlled the Philharmonic's personnel on the basis of race, dismissing the orchestra's four Jewish members in 1935, by 1945 the Americans had blacklisted six players who were former Nazi Party members. 6 The Berlin Philharmonic's music was as highly politicized during the war as after, as musicians were subjected to the restrictions of the reigning regime in order to maintain their positions. In order to investigate why American occupation authorities were so invested in the Philharmonic's rehabilitation, it is essential to understand how the orchestra came to occupy such a highly politicized context in pre-World War II Germany. The ensemble was created in 1882 as a private corporation, with each musician buying into the orchestra at 600 Reichsmarks, giving the Philharmonic complete autonomy. Unfortunately, the orchestra's business model was unsustainable and the Philharmonic began to have financial difficulties as early as 1912. The orchestra's dire economic hardships continued throughout the 1920s as conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler and the ensemble's management fiercely campaigned to have the Prussian, Reich, and Berlin city governments become the Philharmonic's primary shareholders to save the orchestra from financial ruin. The proposed reorganization ultimately fell through, however, and the Philharmonic's finances remained precarious.
Furtwängler. 9 But with governmental funding came an increasingly politicized framework in which the Philharmonic had to perform. The National Socialists wanted to exploit the orchestra's reputation to lend a patina of respectability to the regime. Between 1934 and , the orchestra played at Reichsparteitage (Nazi Party rallies), Hitler's birthday celebrations, the Reichsmusiktage, and Hitler Youth gatherings. During the war, when it was nearly impossible to obtain travel papers to leave Germany, the musicians toured throughout Nazi-occupied Europe, including Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Holland, Italy, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Spain. 10 At the close of each concert tour, orchestra members could bring back food and other materials that had grown scarce in Germany. 11 Not only were they the highest paid musicians in Germany, Philharmonic musicians were also exempt from military service because Goebbels considered concert tours just as vital as armed combat.
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But there were, of course, more sinister undercurrents within the Philharmonic during the 1930s and 40s. 13 The four Jewish members of the orchestra-concertmaster Szymon Goldberg, first violinist Apart from an increasingly hostile political environment, the remaining Philharmonic musicians also witnessed the destruction of their city. From 1943 until 1945, Berlin became the most heavily bombarded 9 Although Strauss's relationship to the Nazi Regime has long been maligned, he was also greatly concerned with protecting his Jewish daughter-in-law and his two grandsons. Goebbels eventually fired him in 1935 when the Gestapo intercepted Strauss's letter to his librettist, Stephan Zweig, in which Strauss wrote he was merely "play-acting" Potter, "Nazi 'Seizure,'" 58; and Misha Aster, Das Reichsorchester: Die Berliner Philharmoniker und der Nationalsozialismus (Munich: Siedler, 2007) , 181-234. Aster writes that at the August 1936 Parteitage in Nuremburg, in one day alone, the Philharmonic managed to play for a larger audience than had comprised their entire previous season. 11 Hartmann, Die Berliner Philharmoniker, [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] Wolf Lepenies, "Eine (fast) alltägliche deutsche Geschichte," foreword to Das Reichsorchester: Die Berliner Philharmoniker und der Nationalsozialismus, by Misha Aster (Munich: Siedler, 2007) , 19. Philharmonic members earned ten percent more than any other musicians in Germany. See also Potter, "Nazi 'Seizure, '" 58. 13 Approximately ten Philharmonic musicians were casualties of the war, killed either by bombing raids or during voluntary military service. Aster, Das Reichsorchester, 327. 14 Although the musicians were not openly dismissed, the Propaganda Ministry placed increasing pressure on the Philharmonic management and Furtwängler to "aryanize" the orchestra. In a 1985 interview, Elizabeth Furtwängler, the conductor's second wife, vehemently denied that it was the orchestra's decision to force out its Jewish members. Ultimately, none of the Jewish musicians who had left the Berlin Philharmonic would resume their positions in the postwar period, although Joseph Schuster did return as a guest artist for Dvořák's Cello Concerto in 1963. For more information, see Aster, Das Reichsorchester, 95, [99] [100] [101] [102] [103] [104] The first postwar Philharmonic concert was given on May 26, 1945, less than one month after Germany's surrender. Hardly any concert venues remained intact, and the Philharmonic's performance was given at the Titania Palast movie theater in Steglitz, a western suburb of Berlin. Leo Borchard, an extremely capable musician whom the Soviets had found hiding in a cellar during the Battle of Berlin, conducted the ensemble. (In the eyes of the Russians, it did not hurt that Borchard spoke fluent Russian from his childhood spent in Moscow, nor that he had been marginally active in Onkel Emil, a small, underground communist resistance group that hid Jews and provided them with falsified documents.) 26 At the inaugural postwar performance, Soviet officers entered with pistols brandished in the middle of Mendelssohn's Midsummer Night's Dream Overture, conversed loudly during Mozart's Violin Concerto in A Major, and left during the final movement of Tchaikovsky's Fourth Symphony. The German audience was powerless to protest. 27 The repertoire was undoubtedly chosen to reflect the orchestra's and the nation's break with National Socialism; Mendelssohn to reintroduce a work by a formerly entartete (degenerate) Jewish composer, and Tchaikovsky to please the Russians. While the German nation may have been defeated militarily, as one postwar critic noted, "In the midst of such shambles, only the Germans could produce a magnificent full orchestra and a crowded house of music lovers."
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For just over two months, the Philharmonic was under Russian jurisdiction before the Americans arrived in Berlin on July 7.
29 The Philharmonic's temporary concert hall was then taken over by the American Second Panzer Division, who intended to use the Titania Palast for troop variety shows. 30 The American Military's Information Control Division (ICD) was staffed with civilian experts tasked with reeducating the German people through music, theater, film, radio, and literature. Although the pairing of Kultur and military rule would seem to be an odd one, at the height of the re-education project, the ICD employed 35 cultural officers and 150 German employees to monitor culture in Berlin. 31 Although massively understaffed, the klein, aber fein (small but fine) music officers were entrusted with an ambitious plan: to re-educate and reorient the local population by altering the performative context around German classical music. Effectively, this meant that there would no longer be musical performances to commemorate former Nazi holidays and that no marches or songs with patriotic themes would be performed at any time. "Horst Wessel Lied," the Nazi party anthem, would no longer open concerts; and music that had been particularly favored by the regime would be carefully monitored to ensure it was not misappropriated. 35 According to regulations set forth by the ICD, each West Berlin ensemble was required to have a license supervised by an American cultural officer. The license was jointly issued in the name of the officer and principal conductor, who were also responsible for the ensemble's artistic integrity. All musicians had to be registered with the ICD in order to ensure they had passed the denazification screening, and repertoire had to be approved ten days in advance by cultural officers, a policy stringently enforced from September 6, 1945 , until May 31, 1947 John Bitter, as the supervisor and military license holder for the Berlin Philharmonic, was involved in everything from locating scores and performance and practice venues, to conducting the orchestra himself on more than thirty occasions, blurring his professional relationship to the ensemble even as he worked tirelessly to ensure the Philharmonic's survival. 37 Bitter understood that the orchestra was a valuable asset in the game of cultural diplomacy, not only between the Americans and the Germans but also in relation to the other Allies. By mid-August, with the help of Bitter and cultural officer Frederic Mellinger, the Philharmonic had already amassed one hundred musicians, and was short by only ten members. Apart from shortages of musicians, however, musical scores were also difficult to find. Not only had countless scores been destroyed in the city's firebombing, but it was nearly impossible to print new music due to a paper shortage that persisted until 1947. (The American Military Government even resorted to reusing certain Nazi Party office supplies for interoffice communication.) 39 Although some of the Philharmonic's music had been moved from Berlin to a basement in Bayreuth, it would take American cultural officers over a year to arrange for its return. Significantly, American Military documents make note only of the music's weight (250 pounds), rather than what scores were actually in the cache. According to one music officer, the re-acquisition was especially fortunate for the Philharmonic, as their programs were "increasingly cramped" 40 due to the absence of the scores. Furthermore, many of the Berlin Philharmonic's instruments were gone, having either been stolen from their hiding place in the Plassenburg, a Renaissance fortress outside Bayreuth, or looted from the Philharmonic's basement and bunker. Erich Hartmann writes, "Likewise, the instruments that had survived the firebombing in the basement of the alte Philharmonie fell into the enemies' [Feinde] hands as booty and were taken east." 41 Note that Hartmann makes certain to use "Feinde" or enemies, when referring to the Russians. Although the Americans may have been victorious militarily, cultural re-education was still an arena in which they were at a decided disadvantage. Especially when compared to the Soviet occupiers, who well understood the value of music, art, and theater in promoting a political agenda, the Americans had difficulty implementing consistent policies in regard to denazification and re-education. While cultural officers were generally specialists in their respective fields, their superiors, like Military Governor Lucius Clay, were career military men who had difficulty grasping that high culture could provide anything more than mere entertainment. Consequently, the denazification and re-education agendas often pitted cultural officers against their military superiors.
Bitter did not appreciate his inferiors' lax attitudes toward the Philharmonic; he was fully aware that the Orchestra could choose to move to the British, or worse yet, Russian zone. Infuriated that other military branches could not see the benefits of the ICD's German re-education program, Bitter complained that military personnel would use the Titania Palast for mere variety shows, as he felt these trivial offerings had "a disastrous effect" on the reorientation program. "It is of the utmost importance," he explained, "that we get the ear of a high authority in this matter so that the Titania, our best US sector theatre, is not used for second-rate variety shows." 42 Bitter was not the only person annoyed by the variety shows; when violinist Yehudi Menuhin came to Berlin to perform with the Philharmonic in 1947, he had to plead with the military police on duty to allow the rehearsal to continue a few minutes past five o'clock. In the photographs, Furtwängler, leaning on the podium railing, is silently and uneasily observing the exchange.
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But the gravest error made by the American Military, in terms of cultural re-education, was the accidental shooting of the Philharmonic's conductor. Around midnight on August 23, 1945, Leo Borchard was killed immediately when a young American solider opened fire on the car in which Borchard was traveling after the vehicle's driver had failed to stop at a mandatory checkpoint. According to eyewitness testimony, Borchard's final words, uttered moments before the accident, were simply, "Next time I will play Bach for you." 44 As one might imagine, Borchard's death, only six weeks after the American arrival, did little to endear the occupiers to German musicians. An untimely four days after his death, Newsweek ran an article on Borchard that made no mention of his death. Instead of his shooting, the magazine cheerily reported:
The problem of German music involves not only what to play-but who can be trusted to play it . . . Leo Borchard, 46-year-old conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic is the only man, according to many critics, around whom the orchestra can hope to rebuild.
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The story continued that Borchard couldn't leave Berlin because the Nazis had prevented his wife from fleeing; the entire article was a fabrication-doubly so now that the article's protagonist was dead. (It was not until 1955, ten years after the shooting, that the American military government declared Borchard's death a Besatzungsschaden, or an occupation casualty, placing the blame on the British.) 46 For the first time in its history, the Philharmonic was now without a clear successor for its conductorship. On August 25, two days after Borchard's death, Robert Heger led the Philharmonic in a performance that opened with the Funeral March of Beethoven's Eroica Symphony, dedicated to Borchard. 47 Only three months earlier, the same movement had been used to mourn Hitler's death. But
American authorities refused to consider Heger, who had been an active Nazi Party member, to be a legitimate replacement for Borchard. 48 Cultural officers wanted desperately to find a new director who was free from the political trappings of Nazi Party membership when an unexpected solution appeared in the form of a twenty-eight-year-old Romanian musician with dapper good looks and excellent timing.
"Celi" and the Philharmonic
In May of 1945, Sergiu Celibidache turned down the chance to flee Berlin as it fell to the Russians. When a group of fellow Romanians offered him a spot in their car heading west, Celibidache declined, reluctant to leave his composition manuscripts behind in Berlin. 49 His fortuitous decision to remain in the city would shape his future career path as a conductor, rather than as a composer. Strässner, Der Dirigent Leo Borchard, 235. 48 According to initial American denazification policies, Berlin's orchestral conductors, soloists, and managers were not considered "ordinary labor," and were therefore held to a higher denazification standard. In practice, however, the Americans would soon realize that it was precisely the leaders of these organizations who were the most compromised. usually credited with finding Celibidache to lead the Philharmonic, it was actually violinist Hermann Bethmann, who had studied with Celibidache at the Hochschule für Musik, who recommended "Celi" (as he would quickly be nicknamed) to lead the orchestra. 50 To the Americans, Celibidache appeared to be the perfect fit for the Philharmonic: he had lived in Berlin since 1936 but had not been a Nazi Party member nor had he served in the Wehrmacht. Apart from these qualifications, he was young, energetic, and nonGerman. By installing a foreigner as principal conductor of the Philharmonic, American authorities hoped to dispel any lingering Nazi claims of German cultural superiority once and for all. Ultimately, one might wonder why Philharmonic musicians and management accepted American occupation policies within Germany's cultural sphere. Undoubtedly, the lengthy denazification process that lasted from 1945 until 1947 was one indisputable reason why German musicians acquiesced to American restrictions. Although Nazi Party membership had not been rampant within the Berlin Philharmonic, each musician still needed to obtain American approval to continuing working in or obtain ration cards for the American sector. It is estimated that around 10 of the 110 musicians in the Berlin Philharmonic were members of the Nazi Party. By comparison, 45 of the Vienna Philharmonic's 117 50 See Monod, Settling Scores, 38; and Hartmann, Die Berliner Philharmoniker, [42] [43] [44] [45] One of the primary goals of the reorientation program in Germany was to broaden the range of musical activity, and "to increase respect for cultural attainments of other nations." In "Directive on United States Objectives and Basic Policy in Germany," July 15, 1947, RG 260, Box 133, Records of the Information Control Division, Central Decimal File of the Executive Office, NARA II. musicians had been party members. 52 This disparity did not go unnoticed, as Bitter admitted in an April 1947 report, "In contrast to the Berlin Philharmonic, the Vienna Philharmonic has always gotten away with murder in its prodigal use of Nazi members." 53 Party members in the Vienna Philharmonic faced few consequences as Austria had already been declared the "first victim" of National Socialism. The ICD did fire six Berlin Philharmonic musicians for their Nazi Party membership, most notably violinist Joseph Stöhr and violist Lorenz Höber in December of 1945. Höber had been responsible for many of the Philharmonic's administrative tasks and was particularly reluctant to relinquish his position. As Music and Theater officer Edward Hogan wrote in May of 1946: "We are told that Höber, the former business manager whom we fired on order of Public Safety, still can't get it through his head that the Americans can get rid of him even though he was hired by the city of Berlin." 54 It is an indisputable fact that through his activities, Furtwängler was prominently identified with Nazi Germany. By allowing himself to become a tool of the party, he lent an aura of respectability to the circle of men who are now on trial at Nuremberg for crimes against humanity. He not only held office under the Nazis, but also was an advisor to the Propaganda Ministry and lent his name to tours abroad sponsored by Goebbels. It is inconceivable that he should be allowed to occupy a leading position in Germany at a time when we are attempting to wipe out every trace of Nazism. 59 The conductor had indeed served as Vice President of the Reichmusikkammer, although he resigned the position in 1934 in support of Paul Hindemith, whose Mathis der Maler was deemed unfit by the National Socialists. (Apart from his RMK Vice Presidency, he also temporarily gave up his conductorship of the Berlin Philharmonic and musical directorship of the Staatsoper.) 60 But his resistance to the Nazis only lasted so long, and in the spring of 1935 Furtwängler issued a letter of apology to the regime. Although he did not resume his position as Vice President, he returned to conducting the Philharmonic at the close of April. 61 Still, contrary to McClure's claim that Furtwängler had "lent his name to tours abroad," it was
Hans Knappertsbusch who led most of the Philharmonic's concert tours in occupied countries, 62 although
Furtwängler had toured with the Vienna Philharmonic in occupied Hungary, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia. He also conducted in neutral Switzerland at a concert sponsored by the National Socialists.
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Furtwängler's denazification process dragged on for nearly two years, as American authorities vacillated between wanting to punish National Socialism's most decorated conductor and still retaining his services in West Berlin. Meanwhile, the Soviets openly campaigned for Furtwängler's return, tempting him with offers to conduct at the Staatsoper rather than waiting for American clearance to return to the Philharmonic. 64 The Russians were more than willing to overlook Furtwängler's recent past for a chance to have him working in their sector. But Furtwängler remained steadfast; he only wanted to be reinstated to conduct his beloved Philharmonic. He knew it would be a symbolic victory if he could resume his former post rather than accepting the Soviets' offer. So he decided to wait. His denazification trial date was finally arranged for December of 1946. As Bitter wrote in an October 1946 report, "Furtwängler will be permitted the use of a lawyer, but for advice only. He must do all the talking himself." 65 The conductor's trial took place on December 11 and 17, 1946, in front of a packed hall and was led by intelligence officer Alex Vogel. Various witnesses were called, including Philharmonic clarinetist Ernst Fischer, who claimed the conductor saved his Jewish wife from deportation. 66 After four months of deliberation, on April 29, 1947, the American Military Government classified Furtwängler as a Mitläufer (follower) and placed him in Category IV, which meant he could still hold a leadership position and return to the Philharmonic. 67 Ultimately, Furtwängler's crime was not that he was a fascist, but rather that he failed to or did not want to recognize the dangerously politicized role the Philharmonic had taken on during the Third Reich. Although Furtwängler claimed to have found the Nazis' cultural politics distasteful, they still provided a platform from which he could conduct in front of packed concert halls. Alter's comments underscore the seemingly contradictory manner in which the ICD handled these denazification proceedings, as both men returned to the stage within two years of the war's end. Ultimately, the Americans did not want to lose Karajan or Furtwängler from their zone. The ICD recognized that two of the most famous musicians in Germany would make better allies than enemies. Despite Furtwängler's reinstatement, the Philharmonic's working conditions were still dire. As Bitter wrote in an August 1947 report:
The Phil is in a bad way. Five of its best first violinists have left the orchestra. In fact it is about 20 players shy of full strength. The morale is low and because of low wage scale, the coming winter, the political situation, etc. the prospects for the future are poor. However, the plans for the next season are ambitious and energetic steps are being taken to right the situation. 71 But the situation in 1948 would prove to be even more difficult, as the Americans barred the Philharmonic from concertizing in the Soviet sector. Residing in the American sector not only required that the orchestra would be at the disposal of American and British authorities; it also meant that as the Cold War became increasingly hot, the ensemble could not openly support the Soviet's Sozialistische Einheitspartei, Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany). 72 In a later interview Bitter recalled his impetus to work in postwar Germany: "I said to myself, now the war is over, now I would like to help rebuild the good Germany; that of Beethoven, Schiller, Goethe, and Brahms. One cannot always continue to conduct war." 73 So instead he conducted the Berlin connections to further his musical career by gaining valuable experience for his return to civilian life. For his first performance for American troops on December 10, 1945, he opened with John Phillip Sousa's The Stars and Stripes Forever in a program that also included the German premiere of Samuel Barber's Adagio for Strings (Figure 3 ). Note that a waltz from Strauss's Der Rosenkavalier is penciled in at the bottom of the program, serving as the encore. Strauss, of course, was one of the very composers the ICD had planned to downplay in postwar Germany. 76 Ultimately, the Philharmonic's music in German postwar society was repoliticized, with the primary difference being the regime for whom they performed. Near the end of his memoir about the Berlin Philharmonic in the early postwar years, double bassist Erich Hartmann contends that the ensemble "belonged to the privileged in the Nazi era, though it was never a Nazi Orchestra." 77 Hartmann's observations raise far more questions than they answer, highlighting the contradictory and uncomfortable cultural politics of the postwar period. Although American authorities viewed the Philharmonic's survival a success for American re-education efforts, the orchestra's own role during National Socialism went unmentioned. After all, the ensemble was already in the service of another patron.
